Carl Henry and His Critics (1)

The previous chapters have delineated certain key features of Carl Henry’s theology, especially as it is expressed in God, Revelation, & Authority. In the following three chapters, I shall attempt to respond to specific charges brought against Henry, particularly by evangelical theologians.[1]

Since we are going back over ground already covered, there will be a good deal of repetition, as I cite Henry’s words to counter the criticisms of others. From one standpoint, these chapters should be unnecessary, for I think you will see that these criticisms seem to stem from apparent ignorance of Carl Henry’s works, including and especially God, Revelation, & Authority.

To substantiate that claim, however, I need to impose upon the reader’s patience and quote Henry at some length. I beg your indulgence as I seek to demonstrate the inaccuracy of the standard claims made against Carl Henry’s theology by prominent scholars.

To be sure, responsible critics – that is, those who seem to have read some of God, Revelation, & Authority - have challenged him at different points. For example, Michael Horton argues that Henry’s belief that Scriptural descriptions of God are univocal rather than merely analogical makes one vulnerable to the errors of open theism.[2] I think Horton is incorrect, but acknowledge this to be a question worthy of debate, and students of theology may decide for themselves whether Horton or Henry makes the better case.[3]

Other charges lack much basis, however, as I shall now proceed to try to demonstrate.

Not a systematic theologian

Olsen and Grenz assert that Henry “published no systematic theology.” Instead, he was a “type of theological journalist, describing and critiquing theological currents as they emerged” (289). They repeat that statement later:” “He has never been a systematic theologian… he has never produced a systematic theology. Rather than a systematician, Henry is perhaps better characterized as a commentator on the fortunes of theology” (291). “A theological journalist, if you will” (289)

Because he “never tackled the challenge of delineating a complete systematic theology,” “his writings reflect certain glaring omissions” (296-297). Albert Mohler identifies two: Ecclesiology, and the doctrine of the Holy Spirit.[4]

They acknowledge the size and scope of God, Revelation & Authority, but complain that “even here Henry cannot but repeatedly engage in analysis of contemporary theological currents” (291)

First let me note the use of rhetoric and assertion, unsupported by solid evidence.

Note that Grenz and Olson imply either timidity or laziness on the party of Henry, who, they say, “never tackled the challenge” writing a complete systematic theology. Or the implication that Henry was merely a journalist who responded to others’ errors, for despite the length of God ,Revelation, & Authority, “even here” Henry cannot but comment on the views of others.

This claim – widely repeated – that Carl Henry was “not a systematic theologian” flies in the face of several hard facts: Henry’s first doctorate was in systematic theology. He claims to be doing systematic theology at many points in God, Revelation, & Authority (for example, 5.334, 376ff.). In GRA, he engages in sustained systematic theology. He starts, like many before and since, with the doctrine of the Word of God in Volumes 1-4. Volume One serves as a Prolegomenon; the following three outline a doctrine of revelation. Volumes Five and Six treat the doctrine of God – theology proper.

Let us admit that these six volumes do not constitute a complete systematic theology. Fair enough. But they are nothing if they are not at least systematic theology. Furthermore, even the first four volumes, ostensibly treating only one doctrine (Revelation), include extensive discussions of other loci of theology: Christology, anthropology, soteriology, ecclesiology, and eschatology – to name a few of the more prominent ones. Though not writing extensively on either subject, Henry does include several chapters on the Holy Spirit and one the church in God, Revelation, & Authority.[5]

In two previous volumes, Henry had dealt with personal ethics and social ethics – also traditional categories for the systematic theologian.

Furthermore, as Albert Mohler has pointed out, “Henry’s theological project has not included a complete systematic theology.”[6] As Mohler explains, Henry sought to direct his attention to those points of theology most under attack from without or in danger of erosion from within the evangelical camp. In this respect, he resembles Augustine of Hippo, Martin Luther, and Jonathan Edwards, to name only a few systematic theologians who did not set out to compose a complete treatment of all the points of theology.

Why emphasize this point? To give evidence for my bold claim that Henry’s critics seem either not to have read his work carefully (or not to have read it at all), or that they evaluate him in a way differently from their assessment of other theologians (such as Bernard Ramm, for example).

That being the case, we can expect their other criticisms to lack sufficient basis as well.[7]

Other criticisms

It seems to me that almost all the criticisms of Henry’s theology fall into one of two categories:

He is faulted for not having taking the Enlightenment seriously enough. That is, he is not modern enough, having failed address the attacks of science, philosophy, and biblical criticism upon the inspiration and authority of the Bible and on the traditional Christian theology that now finds expression among conservative evangelicals, for whom he is the acknowledged spokesman.

On the other hand, Henry is also described as an unwitting product of the Enlightenment, one who relied too much on human reason, believed too firmly in propositional truth, and valued coherence and consistency too highly. These critics say that Henry is too modern, and represents an era that is hopelessly out of date in our new post-modern environment.

As a sort of compendium of some of the criticisms leveled against Henry, we may cite the words of Gordon Lewis and Bruce Demarest. In their otherwise very impressive and most helpful work, Integrative Theology, argue for the superiority of their approach by contrasting it with Systematic Theology. They go on:

Apparently unmoved by charges like those above are presuppositionalists (such as Cornelius Van Til and Rousas Rushdoony) and the deductive rationalists (such as Gordon Clark and Carl Henry). Valuable as the contribution of these writers have been in many ways, their presuppositional and axiomatic methodologies remain unchanged. Consequently, charges of a priori assumptions of the things to be proved, eisegesis, insufficient attention to the history of the doctrines, closed-mindedness, indoctrination, and insufficient relevance continue to limit the extent of their outreach and impact. (I, 24-25).

We shall look at the description of Henry (and Clark) as “deductive rationalists” later, but responses to the others will come in the pages that follow.

Not “modern” enough

Biblical interpretation and criticism

Scholars who largely accept the claims of modern biblical criticism charge Henry with being “less than successful in dealing with historical and critical issues relating to the biblical text and with having an unsteady hand in the area of biblical exegesis” (Patterson 162). Patterson quotes Bernard Ramm to the effect that “he stumbles because he glosses biblical criticism,” and adds that “Henry still has not come to terms with the Enlightenment” (Patterson 162).

On the one hand, this is a matter of presuppositions. If you believe that modern biblical criticism over the past hundred years or so has been largely correct, you will not find Henry’s approach congenial.

Nevertheless, the statements above seem hard to justify in the light of God, Revelation, & Authority.

First, does Henry “gloss” biblical criticism? The American Heritage Dictionary of the English language gives several definitions of “gloss,” none of which seem to fit Ramm’s meaning, which seems to be that Henry pays little attention to, or sets aside lightly, modern biblical scholarship. The other possible meaning is “to give a false interpretation to” something.

In either case, even a cursory reading of GRA would disprove this allegation. For one thing, Henry engages in sustained dialogue with biblical criticism from beginning to end. Modern scholars are referred to countless times, often at considerable length. A glance at the index of any of the volumes (except Volume I, which consists of prolegomena) will show just how widely and deeply Henry had studied dozens of authors. James Barr – perhaps the most influential critic of the views that Henry holds – receives a great deal of attention, but others such as Von Rad (Old Testament) and Bultmann (New Testament) do also.

If Ramm means that Henry willfully distorts the writings of biblical critics, I challenge any reader to come up with examples.

These hundreds of references aside, Chapter 17 of Volume IV, “The Uses and Abuses of Historical Criticism,” address the issue head on. After a survey of different evaluations of the role of modern biblical criticism, Henry notes that “we must abandon all claims to its absolute neutrality, since a presuppositionless methodology is an absurdity and, in fact, an impossibility” (388).

Louis Igou Hodges points out that CH has no fewer than ten “guidelines for the proper use of historical criticism” – hardly possible for one who was supposed to have ignored modern biblical criticism!8 MarkHodges refers to Henry’s writings on Scripture frequently in this excellent evaluation of recent views of the doctrine of Scripture. He also warns against unnecessary and often acrimonious public disputes between evangelicals, a warning Clark Pinnock, writing in the same volume, seems not to have heeded. See “Carl Henry and His Critics (II).”

His own view is that “What is objectionable is not historical-critical method, but rather the alien presuppositions to which neo-Protestant scholars subject it” (393). “Freed from the arbitrary assumptions of critics who manipulate it in a partisan way, the method is neither destructive of biblical truth nor useless to Christian faith; even though its proper role is a limited one, it is highly serviceable as a disciplined investigative approach to past historical events” (401). Here, of course, Henry disagrees with Fundamentalists, who have insisted that the methods of biblical criticism themselves are suspect.

Eisegesis

Perhaps even more serious is the claim that Henry engages in poor exegesis. After all, if his understanding of the Bible is wrong, his theology does not possess much value.

Here again I would ask for evidence. As part of the process of preparing an abridgment of the Chinese edition of GRA, I read the entire work closely; since then, I have gone through it again. The Scripture references run into the thousands. Having studied at a “liberal” seminary, I am familiar with that approach. Since receiving the M.Div. in 1969, my own study, preaching, and teaching (New Testament, Systematic Theology, Hermeneutics) have made me sensitive to the necessity of exegetical precision and accuracy.

In only a very few places – no more than half a dozen - have I questioned Henry’s exegesis.[9] Thus, I wonder whether Ramm and others are merely saying that they disagree with Henry, rather than that he “stumbles” in his handling of the Bible.

Backwardness

As noted earlier, some have said that “Henry still has not come to terms with the Enlightenment” (Patterson 162).

For example, Olsen and Grenz, in 20th Century Theology, although citing those who acclaim Carl Henry as “the prime interpreter of evangelical theology, one of its leading theoreticians” and “ one of the theological luminaries of the twentieth century,” describe Henry is one of those who “turn their faces away from modern theology in any form” (1992:288).

In contrast, Bernard Ramm “represents those who have turned their faces toward modern thinking, in his case, toward contemporary scientific advances and the approach to modern learning advocated by neo-orthodoxy, especially by Karl Barth” (1992:297)

This approach “would allow Ramm to move beyond the tighter categories of others in the evangelical movement and at the end of his career call for his colleagues to embrace a basically Barthian paradigm for theology ‘after fundamentalism.’” (1992:298).

Again: “With his more profound understanding of the positive contributions of the Enlightenment, Ramm was able to move beyond the backward-looking approach of Carl Henry…[He] provided the foundation for a generation of younger evangelical thinkers who would build on the freedom to think critically and engage in positive diaolog with modern culture” (1992:309)

Note the rhetoric here: To turn the face “away from” or “toward”; “throwback”; “backward.” All these words are more than descriptive; they imply values and paint two portraits: Old fashioned, backward, out of date.

Ramm is later described as “The Irenic Evangelical” – again in implied contrast to Henry. He was “thoughtful conservative, one who was able to meet the contemporary intellectual challenges with integrity” (1992:299).

So, Henry – by implication, and to repeat these serious claims – tried to ignore, or reverse, the gains of the Enlightenment; to turn back the theological clock. He turned his face away from modern theology and science. Unlike men such Ramm, he failed to “engage in positive dialog with modern culture.” He somehow lacked “the freedom to think critically.” He did not “Meet the contemporary intellectual challenges with integrity.”

What, we may legitimately ask, does all this mean?

That Henry was unaware of the Enlightenment, or modern biblical criticism, or modern science, or modern theology? Surely not, for his writings are filled with numberless citations of authors since the 17th century. He quotes, and responds to, literally hundreds of writers whose positions can be called “modern” in every sense of the word, as well as those who presage what we now call “post-modern” thought.

We have already seen that he carried on a running conversation with modern biblical criticism. He is also known as a major evangelical student of, and commentator on, modern philosophy and theology, as his many columns in Christianity Today, his edited volumes,[10] at least seven major monographs,[11] and virtually every page in GRA attest. Chapter Ten of Volume I consists of an analysis of the respective roles and relative merits of theology and modern philosophy,

Throughout GRA, Henry is not afraid to challenge what used to be called “the assured results” of modern biblical criticism. As anyone who has followed the fortunes of this field of study for more than a decade knows, its “facts” and “conclusions” have been refuted hundreds of times by archaeology, history, and better exegesis. Often, what passes for biblical criticism is merely the application of yet another set of assumptions to the text, producing a novel interpretation that later research shows to be unwarranted.

Already, what I was taught in a very good liberal seminary only 40 years ago is hopelessly obsolete. The Graf-Wellhausen hypothesis of the Pentateuch is been either complicated and qualified beyond recognition, or shredded by both evidence and exegesis. The reign of Bultmann’s demythologizing and some of the extreme assertions of form criticism and redaction criticism in New Testament studies ended long ago. They are now considered part of the “history of interpretation.” So, who is “backward” and “outdated”?

As for modern science, he devotes several chapters in GRA to the relationship of modern science to theology, and edited a symposium on the subject.[12] Early in Volume I, in “Theology and Science,” Henry explores the relative merits of each discipline. In the process, he displays an impressive awareness of then-current debates on the nature, methods, assumptions, and limits of modern science. By no means does he disparage the very real achievements of modern science – indeed, he repeatedly refers to them – but he does question the legitimacy of some of the assumptions and conclusions about ultimate reality offered by some scientists that go far beyond the evidence they have adduced.

For anyone who took the time to read the chapters on Creation in Volume VI of GRA, Henry’s familiarity with the scientific dimensions of this question would be evident. To take only one example, his treatment of various views of the origin of the world in Volume Six demonstrates wide reading and critical assessment of dozens of works by eminent scientists. While not insisting upon a literal 24-hour-day, six-day creation, he does point out the manifold difficulties in evolutionary theory, almost entirely by showing the contradictions within the evolutionary camp itself.

Had he written GRA a few years later, he could have drawn upon a growing range of scientific works which have appeared in recent years demonstrating the very weak (and perhaps non-existent) case for evolutionary theory.13 With more and more real scientists abandoning the sinking ship of Darwinian evolutionism, those who accuse Henry of doubting its claims may end up on the wrong side of history.

It is hard to understand how anyone could assert that Henry “turned his face away from modern… science.”

So, perhaps Henry was not turning his face away from modern science, philosophy, and theology, but his critical eye at some projects whose wide acceptance may not be warranted. Maybe his “offense” was to show just how weak are the foundations of scientific theory, how subjective are its assumptions, how tentative are many of its “conclusions” – whose constant revision in textbooks goes largely unnoticed – and how little a challenge it really offers to a theology based upon the Bible.

These, charges, then, are either utterly meaningless, or point to something else. “Dialog” must really mean agreement, without questioning either the assumptions, or methods, or findings of much of modern science, theology, and philosophy. It seems that “to turn the face away” means to ask hard questions, point out obvious errors, note contradictions, and question anti-supernaturalistic assumptions latent in much modern scholarship.

Narrow-minded intolerance and rigidity

Henry has also been faulted for failing “to see in different traditions strengths which will complement his own weaknesses” (Paterson 165).

Specifically, “they will want to know why Henry does not also picture God as ecstasy, a personal power ever moving and become, a dynamic energy risking freedom, novelty, and tolerance.” In other words, why he rejects the views of Process theologians, with their challenge “to dance, to play and to invite the freedom that revolutions inevitably invite... They will accuse Henry of being more afraid of embracing error than of losing truth” (Patterson 165).

Roger Olson, author of a mildly-evangelical history of theology, says that Henry’s “star faded in the 1980s and 1990s as he retreated more and more toward a narrow, almost fundamentalistic mentality.” By contrast, Donald Bloesch is described in glowing terms as one who “intended to hold the two impulses of Protestant orthodoxy and pietism together in a ‘theology of Word and Spirit’” (Olson 595).

Olson had earlier described fundamentalists as

“those Protestant Christians who defend entire, detailed systems of very conservative doctrines against perceived modernist, liberal encroachments and dilutions, and they often call for and practice separation form Christians who are guilty of participating in or condoning modernism in theology. [They] insist on belief in the supernatural, verbal inspiration of the bible, absolute biblical inerrancy with regard to historical and natural as well as theological matters, a literalistic biblical hermeneutic, and strong opposition to any and all deviations from these principles…” (556)

He later condenses that characterization to those who

“consider the true essence of Christianity to be a system of detailed and precise unrevisable doctrinal propositions… see their primary mission as defending that true Christ faith against liberal theology and higher criticism, and that that strict biblical inerrancy is the cornerstone doctrine of evangelical Christianity” (569).

To what extent, if at all, do these criticisms apply to Carl Henry?

To begin with, let us listen to his own words, in the Preface to GRA: “I have spent memorable hours with twentieth-century luminaries [some of whom he then lists]. These scholars represent much of the wide spectrum of contemporary theology…I am deeply indebted to scholars of various traditions.”[14]

On the one hand, we can readily admit that he did not accept liberal theology, and spent much of his life pointing out its departures from biblical teaching. He found much of modern biblical criticism to be lacking, as we have seen, and presented a case for the essential reliability of the Bible, especially in GRA. Yes, he did believe in both the infallibility and the inerrancy of Scripture. And he was strongly opposed to all deviations from what he considered to be the truths found in the Bible.

So, was he therefore narrow-minded, unable to perceive the value of others’ points of view, and increasingly fundamentalistic in his later years?

Anyone who either met Carl Henry or has read much of his voluminous writing will find these descriptions hard to match with the man and his works. He began by criticizing the fundamentalists, continued by associating with all sorts of people whom fundamentalists would shun – including Billy Graham – and incurred the wrath of many conservative evangelicals and fundamentalists by publicly distancing himself from both the style and substance of Harold Lindsell when he began his “Battle for the Bible.”

He did not make inerrancy the centerpiece of his theology, and refused to use it as a litmus test for orthodoxy.

Nor would he, like most fundamentalists and many evangelicals, insist upon a detailed system of eschatology. The last chapter in GRA, “The Finalities,” paints a sweeping panorama of the end times that would make a true fundamentalist cringe with dismay over its lack of precision – but thrilled this reader’s heart.

To the end, he called for cultural engagement, while fundamentalists, and many evangelicals, were focusing on those “Left Behind.” He worked all his life for church unity, deploring the fractured state of evangelicalism and the separatist stance of fundamentalists.

By what stretch of the imagination could Carl Henry be considered “fundamentalistic”?

His reverence for God and for the revelation which he thought God had given in Scriptures did make him afraid both to lose the truth and to embrace error – a quality, one would assume, requisite for all theologians.

For good reasons, he could not join the parade with process theology, and thus did not write much about God dancing or playing – categories admittedly not prominent in the Bible, which Henry considered to be the primary source for Christian theology.[15]

His respect for Karl Barth is seen in the hundreds of quotations from the Swiss theologian’s Church Dogmatics, which Henry had obviously studied carefully. Many are appreciative; Henry was not afraid to welcome Barth as a theological ally and to draw upon his genius. On the other hand, Henry believes that Barth’s doctrine of the Word of God is hopelessly confused by its sustained dialectic, unnecessarily founded on wholesale acceptance of the assumptions and conclusions of German biblical critics, and at odds with Barth’s own use of the Bible as functionally authoritative.16

He could not, therefore, embrace Barthianism as Ramm and his admirers have done. Does that make him narrow-minded?

Finally, a careful reading of GRA, not to mention a number of other works by Henry, would show how he, too, combined both Pietism and scholarship in a “theology of Word and Spirit.”17

To return to the sweeping charges of Demarest and Lewis cited towards the beginning of this chapter, which sum up much of what others have also alleged, one must simply either assume that these words are meant to apply to the other authors mentioned by Demarest and Lewis, or that they (and the others whose similar charges we have examined) have not read God, Revelation, & Authority very carefully. Since ( unlike Bloesch) Demarest and Lewis cite GRA often in their own work, I am left wondering what motivated them to pen these sentences, other than a desire to set off their own method (which I personally like very much) against all others.

Lest the reader imagine that I think Carl Henry to be beyond responsible criticism, let me say that he himself acknowledges his finitude and fallenness, and disclaims any finality to his own theological approach. Furthermore, I do not fully agree with every statement in GRA.

Bibliography

• Campbell-Jack, W.D. and McGrath, Gavin. New Dictionary of Christian Apologetics. Downers Grove: Inter-Varsity Press, 2006.
• Conn, Harvie M. Contemporary World Theology: A Layman’s Guidebook. Second Revised Edition. Presbyterian & Reformed, 1974
• Evan, C. Stephen. Pocket Dictionary of Apologetics & Philosophy of Religion. Downers Grove: Inter-Varsity Press, 2002.
• Henry, Carl F.H. God, Revelation, & Authority. Volumes I-VI. Waco: Word Books, 1976-1983.
• Lewis, Gordon R. & Demarest, Bruce A. Integrative Theology. Three Volumes in One. Grand Rapids: ZondervanPublishingHouse, 1996.
• Ovey, M.J. “Rationalism” in Campbell-Jack, W.D. and McGrath, Gavin, New Dictionary of Christian Apologetics. Downers Grove: Inter-Varsity Press, 2006:592-594.
• Grenz, Stanley J., and Olson, Roger E. 20th-Century Theology: God & the World in a Transitional Age. Downers Grove: Inter-Varsity Press, 1992.
• Patterson, Bob E. Carl F.H. Henry, in Makers of the Modern Theological Mind. Waco, Texas: Word, 1883.
• Trembath, Kern Robert. Divine Revelation. New York: Oxford University Press. 1991.

Notes

1. More or less negative assessments of Carl Henry’s theological project may be found in Conn, Ford, Livingston, Gabriel Fackre, Donald Bloesch, Bernard Ramm, Clark Pinnock, White, Stanley Grenz, and especially Roger Olson, Twentieh Century Theology (with Stanley Grenz); The Story of Theology; Westminster Handbook to Evangelical Theology
2. Michael Horton, “Hellenistic or Hebrew? Open Theism and the Reformed Theological Method,” in Beyond the Bounds: Open Theism and the Undermining of Biblical Christianity. Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2003, page 227.
3. Henry deals with the univocal, as opposed to analogical, nature of language about God in III, 363-366; V, 86, 131, 148, 233, 262, 355, 369.
4. Mohler, “Carl Henry,” 292.
5. On the Holy Spirit: IV, 11,12, 20-22; V,9, 10; the church: IV, 21-22.
6. R. Albert Mohler, Jr., “Carl F.H. Henry,” in Timothy George and David S. Dockery, Theologians of the Baptist Tradition, 292.
7. The same is true for the critique of Kern Robert Trembath, in his Divine Revelation (New York: Oxford University Press. 1991) 31-58. Despite an apparently careful reading of Henry, closer examination of Trembeth’s argument must lead to the conclusion that he came to GRA with some assumptions and disagreements, and found ways to validate these. His superficial criticism appears logically tight and rigid, but rests upon such a limited knowledge of GRA and obvious misunderstanding that it does not deserve to be refuted in detail here.
8. Louis Igou Hodges, “New Dimensions in Scripture,” in NDET, 228. Hodges refers to Henry’s writings on Scripture frequently in this excellent evaluation of recent views of the doctrine of Scripture. He also warns against unnecessary and often acrimonious public disputes between evangelicals, a warning Clark Pinnock, writing in the same volume, seems not to have heeded. See “Carl Henry and His Critics (II).”
9. I am not sure whether he is right about the meaning of YHWH (and he merely states his opinion after surveying a variety of options); his interpretation of “phOtizO” in John 1:9; his interpretations of Genesis 1 and of Romans 2:14-15.
10. Such as Christian Faith and Modern Theology.
11. Reaching the Modern Mind; The Protestant Dilemma; Fifty Years of Protestant Theology; The Drift of Western Thought; Evangelical Responsibility in Contemporary Theology; Frontiers in Modern Theology; Faith at the Frontiers.
12. Horizons of Science.
13. These include Evolution: A Theory in Crisis, by Michael Denton; Icons of Evolution, by Jonathan Wells (with two PhD degrees in science); Intelligent Design, by Dembski; Darwin’s Black Box, by Michael Behe; Darwin On Trial, by Philip Johnson; and the earlier Man’s Origin, Man’s Destiny, by A.E. Wilder-Smith (three PhD degrees in science); plus multiple articles by scholars such as the mathematician Berlinski.
14. GRA, Volume I, 9-10
15. Henry addresses Process Theology in various places, especially VI, 3, as well as V,15.
16. For a more detailed review of Henry’s reasons for not embracing the theology of Karl Barth, see Patterson, 48-50.
17. See, for example, chapters 11 and 12 in Volume IV of GRA on the role of the Holy Spirit in the creation and interpretation of the Scripture.